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Abstract
Variations in repo haircuts play a crucial role in leveraging (or deleveraging) in security
markets, as observed in the two major economic events that happened so far in this century,
the US housing bubble that burst into the great recession and the European sovereign debts
episode. Repo trades are secured but recourse loans. Default triggers insolvency. Collateral
may be temporarily exempt from automatic stay but creditors’ final reimbursement depends
on the bankruptcy outcome. We show examples of bankruptcy equilibria. We infer how
haircuts are related to asset or counterparty risks whenever a bankruptcy equilibrium exists.
1We acknowledge comments from audiences at UECE 2016 Game Theory Meetings (Lisbon, November 2016)
and SAET 2017 (Faro, June 2017). Guillermo Ramı́rez was supported by a doctoral grant given by FCT,





In a repo trade, a security is pledged as collateral for a cash loan and can then by reused by
the cash lender, that is, pledged in a another contract or short-sold. The reuse of the collateral
makes repo trades quite different from mortgage loans where the durable good collateral stays
put. The resulting leverage was studied in detail by Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2012), under
the assumption that agents always fulfilled their financial obligations.
Leverage played a major role in the recent financial crisis of 2008. Leading to the crisis, it
was not only households that were highly indebted but also large financial institutions. These
large institutions turned to the shadow banking system to finance themselves (see e.g. Gorton
and Metrick (2010)). The repo market is a crucial part of this system. The haircut applied to the
loan given in a repo trade is inversely related to how much agents can build up their positions
in a security by using the repo market as a means of financing security positions. Security
and repo trades can be combined in way that allows security positions to be increased, as the
security gets pledged as collateral in repo, then repledged or short sold by the creditor (then
again pledged by the counterparty of the short seller and so on). How do collateral reuse and
haircuts determine what leverage is? The former may be an ingredient but does not determine
by itself what leverage is (and limitations on reuse do not automatically translate into targeted
reductions in leverage). For long agents to lever up to haircut potential, the reuse of the collateral
only becomes necessary when the wealth of these agents is high enough and the haircut is low
enough that the resulting aggregate leveraged long positions exceed aggregate initial holdings
of the security. It is ultimately the haircut that determines what leverage is (and it could be
the shorts being leveraged instead). More recently, in the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-12, there
was substantial deleverage (also of those short selling) caused by the consecutive hikes in repo
margins on bonds issued by several European governments.
Given that leverage and the haircut are inversely related, it is crucial to understand how
the latter is determined. The haircut is the difference between the values of the collateral and
the respective cash loan, at the time when the repo trade starts. It is usually expressed as
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a percentage (less than or equal to 1) of the collateral value. Equivalently, the initial margin
captures that difference by expressing the collateral value as a percentage (greater than or equal
to 1) of the cash loan. A repo trade has a purchase leg and then a repurchase leg at a repurchase
price that is locked in at the first leg. The difference between the purchase price (the cash loan)
and the repurchase price is the repo interest rate, agreed upon in advance. Hence, in the absence
of default, there would be no reason to charge a haircut. The haircut reflects the cash lender’s
perceived risk of loss in the event of the cash borrower’s default.
In this article we model the limited commitment involved in repo trades. In this respect, also,
there is a key difference by comparison with what happens in many (but not all) mortgages, as
captured in the GE collateral literature. Repo trades are recourse loans, whereas many (but
not all) mortgages are non-recourse. If an household that has signed a non-recourse mortgage
decides to default, it would just surrender the house and walk away without suffering any other
penalties. That is not the case in recourse loans: in the event of default, creditors can be repaid
above the collateral liquidation value by forcing the bankruptcy of the faulty borrower and then
becoming claimants in the partition of the borrower’s estate. It may also happen that creditors
end up recovering less than the collateral liquidation value, when that is the outcome from the
partition of the estate among all creditors. Repo collateral is exempted from certain provisions
of the US Bankruptcy Code that normally apply to pledges, in particular, the automatic stay
on enforcement of collateral in the event of insolvency. That is, creditors can keep the collateral
that had been pledged to them (and can sell it) but, when the bankruptcy court takes the final
decisions, they may get more or less than what their claim was (the promised repayment) and
this may be different from the liquidation value of the collateral.
It should be noted that when an agent goes bankrupt, it is not just the repayment of the cash
borrowed in repo that is at stake. If a security happened to be pledged to this agent in repo,
then this collateral will not be given back to the cash borrowers - a “fail” occurs as a result of
bankruptcy - and the respective manufactured dividends due to the beneficial owner will not be
paid also.
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Default is a very serious event and needs to be modeled by taking into consideration the whole
bankruptcy process. It is not a decision that can be taken asset by asset, comparing promised
payments and collateral values. Debtors can’t be assumed to be repaying the minimum of these
two, contrary to what happens in non-recourse loans, as shown in a long standing literature
emerging from the work by Geanakoplos and Zame in the nineties (see Geanakoplos (1997),
Geanakoplos and Zame (1997) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2014)). For the same reason,
default can’t be avoided by designing contracts so that collateral values never fall below promised
payments, as was the case in a contemporaneous literature dating back to Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). Garnishable estates must now be set against total debts (net of credits that the defaulter
may be entitled to). This creates a non-convexity in the borrower’s budget set that seems to
have put off previous research efforts.
There are however interesting results that can be established, in spite of the intrinsic non-
convexity of individual decision problems. We consider binomial economies, where just two states
of nature, U or D, may occur after the initial node (and each of these states may be followed
without uncertainty into a third date). Our paper focus on over-the-counter (OTC) repo, that
is, trades that are not centrally cleared through an exchange (or central clearing counterparty,
CCP), and bilateral (as opposed to tri-party where collateral selection, payment, custody and
settlement are outsourced to a third-party agent). Our finite-agent model does not let us explore
the convexifying effect of large numbers that has been used in continuum of agents models in
several contexts, including in consumer bankruptcy problems with unsecured loans (see Araujo
and Pascoa (2002) and Sabarwal (2003)). However, modeling the agents set as a continuum
is not appropriate in a context of OTC repo where each trader should anticipate counterparty
bankruptcy risk and choose repo haircuts accordingly2.
For equilibrium to exist, leverage should be bounded. Here there is another important dis-
tinction between credit backed by securities and credit backed by houses or productive resources.
2A bankruptcy analysis might be doable also for centrally cleared repo, but aggregate default risk should take
the place of counterparty risk. The OTC case seems to be more informative and easier to relate to the applied
literature on the determinants of repo haircuts.
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In the latter, the aggregate supply of collateral is fixed and, therefore, under exogenous collat-
eral margins, borrowing becomes bounded. In the former, the collateral supply is endogenous
since it includes short-sales and, therefore, there are no a priori bounds on secured borrowing,
even under exogenous margins. However, repo and security positions must be related in another
way: the net security title balance held by each agent must be non negative. This is known as
the box constraint and says that in to order to pledge the agent must be long in the security
and in order to short-sell the agent must be long in repo (the security being pledged to him).
In the one-security case, by combining the box and budget constraints we can bound secured
borrowing. This would be enough to bound all sorts of leverage (long or short) in convex full
commitment economies. However, in non-convex economies allowing for bankruptcy, we need to
bound secured lending as well, since an equilibrium for a truncated economy (whose portfolios
are assumed to be market feasible) may fail to be an equilibrium. In the multi-security case, it
was already known that, even in the convex full commitment setting, other constraints should
be added with the purpose of bounding repo and security trades3.
In order to gain intuition and allow for a full characterization of equilibria, we start by
examining a one-security and two-agent case. In this simple case, the optimist is long in the
security (short in repo) and the pessimist is short in the security (long in repo). We find equilibria
where both or just the former go bankrupt (the former in the state where the security has lower
returns and the latter in the other state). Then, we contemplate the multi-security and multi-
agent case to see what are the determinants of haircuts. On this issue, there are different views
in the applied literature. Gorton and Metrick (2012) argue that haircuts depend both on the
underlying asset and on who is the counterparty in a repo transaction but that, particularly in
times of crisis, the latter gains importance. In contrast, Krishnamurty et al. (2014) report little
variation of haircuts across counterparties and place much more weight on the underlying asset.
Infante (2015) argues that these observed differences on haircuts arise because two different
3See Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2012) on bounds that result from the segregation of haircuts or the distinction
between dealers and non-dealers and Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2017) on bounds that follow from equity
requirements in the spirit of the Basel regulation of banks.
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markets are studied: the bilateral and tri-party repo.
The loss that a lender may suffer from counterparties’ default may be related to the collateral
falling in value (or being sold in a fire sale) but, since the loan is recourse, the loss cannot be
associated to that asset risk in such a simple way. It may happen that there is no asset risk but
the counterparty risk will nevertheless govern what the lender gets back, which does not have to
be equal to the collateral liquidation value. What a secured creditor recovers in the bankruptcy
process depends on what is the liquidation value of the whole estate of the defaulter and how it
will be partitioned among all creditors, even though the exemption from automatic stay allows
the creditor to sell the collateral while waiting for the final outcome of the bankruptcy process.
We characterize how haircuts respond to asset and counterparty risks. Suppose there are
many traders in the repo market of each security, repo rates are security-specific but haircuts
are specific to each pair of traders. In such competitive setting, we should expect counterparty
bankruptcy risk to affect pair-specific haircuts but not the repo rate, as opposed to what happens
in the two-agent example. Say state D is the state where bankruptcy may occur. Suppose an
agent i is solvent in state D and is, in terms of the whole portfolio, a net creditor to a counterparty
j (in state D) and the expected repayment rate of this counterparty decreases (an increased
counterparty risk). Then, agent i would like to raise (lower) the haircut charged to counterparty
j when accepting collateral from j, for securities whose repo repayment exceeds (falls below) the
collateral value. That is, when the asset is risky from the creditor’s perspective, haircuts tend
to move in the same direction as the counterparty risk. But for the other securities (risky from
the debtors’ point of view, wary of a repo fail), haircuts move in the opposite direction.
Quite differently, in the two-agent and one-security example, counterparty risk affects the repo
rate and his effect is strong enough to make bankruptcy rates decrease as the haircut increases.
In a small numbers context, it is now the other direction that may become more relevant: how
are overall solvency rates affected when the haircut charged in one security changes? That is
why in such extreme non-competitive case, haircuts and expected repayment rates may move
together, contrary to our results for the competitive case. To summarize, the way counterparty
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risk may impact haircuts depends on how competitive the repo market is and to understand how
that impact works in the competitive case we need to couple this risk with asset risk. When
faced with a rise in counterparty risk, competitive creditors tend to ask for higher haircuts for
securities that exhibit an asset risk from the creditors’ perspective, but lower haircuts may arise
if the security involves the opposite risk (a fail rather than a default risk).
2 The Model
2.1 Fundamentals
We consider a binomial economy with three dates. At an initial date (date 0) there is only one
node in the event tree, followed by nodes U and D at the second date. Each second date note
has a unique successor at the third date: U+ and D+ are the successors of U and D, respectively.
As we will see, the third date just serves to guarantee that securities retain value at the second
date, when borrowing and lending transactions are settled (and we may want to dispense with
the third date in some cases, as discussed below).
Figure 1: Events tree of the binomial economy.
Binomial models have been used to study the leverage cycle in economies with default on
non-recourse loans (see e.g., Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014)).
Given that repo trades constitute recourse loans, we will model default as a bankruptcy process.
There is only one consumption good. Markets for this commodity open at each event. We
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denote the price of this good at event e by pe. There is a finite set of I ≥ 2 agents, indexed by i.









are also F real securities indexed by f , each one being characterized by a vector of non-negative
real returns Rf = (RfU , RfD, RfU+ , RfD+). Given spot prices pe, the nominal return of security
f is peRfe
4.
Trading of securities occurs at the first and second dates. Each agent chooses a securities
portfolio φi ∈ R3F consisting of positions in the F securities at the initial nodes and nodes U
and D. Security prices are denoted by q ≡ (qfe ) ∈ R3F . Agents’ endowments of commodities are
ωi ∈ R5+, with ωis > 0 in both states. Agents have initial holdings, at date 0, of each security
f , oif > 0. Preferences are described by utility functions U
i : R5+ → R. For each security f , we






Agents can have negative positions in securities, short-sales are permitted. Short-selling, however,
is not the same as issuing (which we take as given this model, having occurred prior to date 0).
In order to short-sell a security, an agent must go first in the repo market and borrow the desired
amount of securities. This is the way short-selling is actually done in reality.
Borrowing of securities actually consists in buying the security and promising to resell it to
the lender, at a future date and at a predetermined price. There is a difference between the
price at which a security is bought, in the first leg of the transaction, and the price at which it is
resold to its original owner, in the second leg of the transaction, at a future date. This difference
is captured by the repo rate. The highest repo rate within its class of securities is referred to as
the general collateral rate (GC).
The borrower of a security acquires possession rights associated with the security. However,
any coupon or dividend paid to the borrower during the term of the transaction is passed through
to the original owner; this is called a manufactured payment or a manufactured dividend.
4We could have considered nominal securities instead.
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A repo transaction is actually a collateralized loan. If agent i buys security f from j in the
first leg of the transaction, i is at the same time the borrower of the security and a lender of
cash, and j is the lender of the security and borrower of cash. A haircut (1− hijf ) is applied to
the market value of the security to compensate the lender of funds for the risk associated to the
transaction, so that the cash loan may be lower than the value of the collateral. Haircut is such
that 0 < hijf ≤ 1.
For simplicity, repo trading takes place only at date 0. We denote by zijf agent i’s repo
position, with counterparty j, on security f . If zijf > 0, it means that i is the lender of cash and
borrower of the security and we say that he is long in repo. At the same time, since markets
must clear, we should expect that zjif < 0, which means that agent j is a borrower of cash, a
lender of the security, and we say that he is short in repo.
Given that a haircut is applied to every repo transaction, the amount of funds that can be
borrowed by pledging one unit of security f in the repo market, in a transaction with counter-





the haircut applied to transactions in the repo market involving security f and counterparties i
and j, regardless of which one of the agents is long in repo for security f and which one is short.
Denote by ρf the repo rate of a loan backed by security f and let rf = 1 + ρf .
An important feature of a repo transaction is that the borrower of the security has the right
to lend it in the repo market or short-sell it in the security market. That is, the collateral can be
rehypothecated directly or indirectly, and this process may occur many times over for the same
settlement period. This is an important feature of repo markets as it it the reuse of the collateral
that allows agents to leverage their portfolio positions or their cash loans beyond what would be
possible if collateral was used only once.
There is a constraint that captures both the need to pledge collateral when borrowing cash
in repo and the need to borrow a security (accept it as collateral) when short-selling it. This
is the box constraint. This restriction states that the agent must hold a nonnegative amount of
the security in his possession. That is, the sum of security position and repo trades must be
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nonnegative. At the initial date (the only node where repo markets are open) the box constraint





At second date nodes, repo markets are not open and the box constraints reduce to plain no-
short-sales constraints:
(2) φifU ≥ 0, φifD ≥ 0
When there is more than one security, without any further assumptions on portfolio or repo po-
sitions, leverage can be unbounded (see Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2012) on some institutional
arrangements that bound leverage). In this paper we take the simple approach of imposing some
bounds on repo positions whenever there is a need to bound leverage5.
2.3 Bankruptcy and feasible market plans
Given market prices and repo rates, (p, q, r), agents decide on a plan (xi, φi, zi), consisting
of consumption and portfolios in the securities and repo markets. Let us define the budget
constraints that these plans must satisfy. At date 0, the repo market opens and agents have
initial endowments of goods and securities. Agent i’s budget constraint at this date is:
p0(x
i















Repo markets do not open at the second date but agents can still trade in securities, using real
payments from their previous securities positions. We allow for the possibility of agents not
fulfilling their obligations in the second date. This only happens if agents become insolvent.
For every agent, we need to see how do assets set against liabilities, in each state of the second
date. On the assets’ side we have a first component which is the new market value plus returns
associated with the actual amount of each security that the agent has in his possession when he
5In the one-security model in Section 3, leverage will be bounded and no further constraints will be imposed
on financial positions.
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enters that node. This (non-negative) amount is what the agent had in his date 0 box for the
corresponding security. By adding up the current market value and returns, across all securities,











To evaluate assets or liabilities resulting from repo positions taken at the previous node, we need
to remember that repo positions consist of securities that the agent has received (borrowed) or
pledged (lent) as collateral backing a cash loan. If agent i borrowed security f from agent j at
the initial node (zijf > 0), he must return the security together with the respective returns to its
original owner, that is, pass on the non-negative value zijf (qfs+psRfs) to agent j but at the same
time agent j must repay (at the gross rate rf ) to i the cash loan he obtained before. Conversely,
a repo short agent repays the cash loan and gets back the value of the security he pledged as
collateral. The settling of all of agent i’s repo transactions with agent j as counterparty is








f rf − (qfs + psRfs)
]
If all repo transactions are settled as was agreed upon at the initial date, that is, if every agent
is solvent in state s, agent i’s corresponding budget constraint is:
ps(x
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Since repos are recourse loans, insolvency will occur in state s only if the agent’s assets are
insufficient to cover his liabilities. The assets include the value of the past box positions, plus
the positive settlements of his repo transactions, plus the garnishable portion (according to
some coefficient β) of his commodity endowment in that state. Liabilities consist in the negative
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Here, Iij+s and I
ij−
s denote the positive and the negative parts
6, respectively, of Iijs , while η
j
s
denotes the portion of all of agent j’s financial obligations that he effectively repays given his
income in that state. That is, ηjs = 1 if j is solvent in state s and η
j
s < 1 when he declares
bankruptcy. In words, agent i declares bankruptcy in state s if, and only if, the garnishable
portion of his commodity endowment (βpsω
i
s), plus the value of the securities in his possession
at the beginning of the second date (Ξis), plus the positive repo repayments the agent gets from






s ) is not sufficient to repay all of agent i’s repo obligations
(Iij−s ).
Once we allow bankruptcy, agent i’s budget constraint in state s of the second date is:
ps(x
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At the last date there is no trading of securities. Agents consume from their commodity en-










Given parameters (p, q, r), an agent’s plan of consumption, of securities, and of repo positions
(xi, φi, zi), will be called feasible if xi ≥ 0 and conditions (1), (2), (3), (4) and (6) hold. We
denote by Bi(p, q, r) the set of all feasible plans for agent i, and by Bi?(p, q, r) the subset of utility
maximizing plans in Bi(p, q, r).
2.4 Equilibrium
For this economy, equilibrium is defined as follows:
6Iij+s = max{0, Iijs } and Iij−s = −min{0, Iijs }.
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Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is an allocation of bundles, securities and repo
positions (x, φ, z) together with prices (p, q, r) and haircuts implied by h = (hijf ), such that:
(a) for each agent i, (xi, φi, zi) ∈ Bi?(p, q, r, h),























f Rfs+ for s
+ = U+, D+,




fe = 1 at each event e = 0, U,D,U
+, D+,
(d) repo markets clear: zijf + z
ji
f = 0 for all i, j and f .
3 A one-security and two-agent model
We can now take our base model and consider the simplest of economies. Suppose there are
only two dates, only one security (F = 1 and we dispense with the index f for the security)
and only two agents indexed i and j with ωi0 = ω
j
0 = 0 and o
i = oj = 1. Agents utilities
are simply the expected consumption at the second date: U i(xiU , x
i
D) = a
ixiU + (1− ai)xiD and





D. To simplify we have dispensed with the third date and assumed
repo to maturity7, that is, both repo trades are settled at the maturity date of the security (even
though the security does not have a price at the second date it can still serve as collateral, since
its second date value consists in its returns given by Rs).
As there is only one security and one pair of agents, we simplify notation by letting h =
hij = hji, zi = zij and zj = zji. Suppose RU > RD and that agents’ subjective probabilities
are different enough as to guarantee trade in the repo market: EiR > EjR, where EiR ≡
aiRU + (1− ai)RD. This is the same as assuming that ai > aj .
7This type of repo trades occurs in reality, although some agents (in particular, central banks) are not willing
to engage in it.
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Figure 2: Economy with 2 dates. Security’s price and payments.
Normalizing prices so that the security price is one, we can write agent i’s constraints as:
φi + hzi = oi, (First date)





− βωis, (oi + (1− h)zi)Rs
+ηjs[(hr −Rs)zi]+ − [(hr −Rs)zi]−
}
, (Second date, state s)
The box constraint determines what that largest short repo position an agent can take is:




Note that the magnitude of the position in equation (7) can be many times higher than the total
initial supply of the security in the economy (oi+oj). Building such a large short repo position is
possible because of the re-usability of collateral in repo markets. At the same time, the position
is not unbounded because of the haircut8: how much an agent can leverage his initial endowment
of the security is related inversely to the haircut applied in the repo market. This is one good
reason to define the asset specific leverage as the inverse of the haircut applied to the security
when used as collateral in the repo market: 11−h .
At the first date, we will require that long repo positions are also limited by the asset specific
8See Bottazzi, Luque and Páscoa (2012) for a complete example of how these positions are built in repo markets
with one security.





If we substitute xiU and x
i
D into agent i’s utility function, we can write his problem as:
Maximize
Eiωi + ai max
{
− βωiU , (oi + (1− h)zi)RU + η
j
U [(hr −RU )z
i]+ − [(hr −RU )zi]−
}
+ (1− ai) max
{
− βωiD, (oi + (1− h)zi)RD + η
j
D[(hr −RD)z
i]+ − [(hr −RD)zi]−
}
s. t.




The only decision variable in the problem is zi and the agent only needs to decide whether to
be long (zi > 0) or short (zi < 0) in repo. Given our assumption on security payments and
utilities, it is reasonable9 to search for equilibria in which hr ∈ (EjR,EiR). Given the relative
weights of each state in agents i and j utility function it is also reasonable to start for equilibria
by assuming agent i to be repo short (zi < 0), and j to be repo long (zj > 0).
Being short in repo, agent i can potentially transfer consumption from state D to state U ,
which gives him comparatively more utility. In other words, agent i is an optimist with regard
to this security (as he puts more weight in the state where the security pays more) and this
suggests that he should be long in the security and leverage his long position by being short in
repo. However, taking a short repo position is not guaranteed to increase his consumption in
state U , or to yield an increase in overall utility, since this depends on the agent’s counterparty
effective repayment rate in state U (ηjU ).
We cannot completely rule out agent i taking a long repo position even though this would
transfer consumption from a high utility state to a state with low utility. The reason for this is
9In fact, it is easy to see that if hr > EiR or hr < EjR both agents will want to take either long or short repo
positions, and there cannot be market clearing.
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that bankruptcy limits the utility loss in state U and, depending on how large his long repo posi-
tion is allowed to be, the increase of utility experienced in state D could more than compensate
this loss.
Ultimately, whether agent i takes a long or short repo position will depend on his endowments
on each state and in how much he can leverage his position. If leverage is low enough as to rule
out bankruptcy, then i necessarily takes a short position (zi < 0).
Starting with the assumption that i is short in repo, his position will be determined by the
box constraint. In fact, as the utility function is linear, agent i will pick the largest possible short
repo position. Since we know that xis ≥ (1 − β)ωis > 0 no matter what the portfolio might be,
agent i is not constrained in his choice by non negativity of xis in any state. It is just the box





Market clearing requires that if agent i is short in repo, agent j must be long. Again, the
linearity of utilities requires that j takes the maximum position that he can in the repo market.





With these repo positions, agents i and j are solvent in states U and D, respectively. In fact,
in state U agent i has a non-negative financial income: (oi + (1− h)zi)RU + ηjU [(hr−RU )zi]+−
[(hr − RU )zi]− = (oi + (1 − h)zi)RU + ηjU (RU − hr)|zi| ≥ 0 > −βωiU . Therefore, agent i does
not become insolvent, actually makes xiU ≥ ωiU (and analogously for agent j in state D).
However, agent i is decreasing consumption in state D and we cannot be sure of his solvency
in that state. The same applies for agent j in state U . If we let αis = 1 iff agent i is solvent in








1 1 0 0 1
2 1 0 1 1
3 1 1 0 1
4 1 1 1 1
It will be useful to denote by zs the position of the short repo agent and zl the position of the
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long repo agent. We have argued that the short agent (whoever he is) will be solvent in state U
while the long agent will be solvent in state D.
Next we note that whether an agent goes bankrupt or not in a certain state depends entirely
on how the agent’s obligation in that state compares with the garnishable portion of his income.
For a given β and h we can compute the (gross) repo rate that equalizes the two and that we











If r < rs we have αsD = 1 and, if r > r
s, αsD = 0.











If r < rl we have αlU = 0 and, if r > r
l, αlU = 1.
Suppose that the parameters of the model are such that RD/h < r
s < rl < RU/h. If we
consider a given haircut and for a fixed β we have that depending on the repo rate, bankruptcy








r < rs 1 1 0 1
rs < r < rl 1 0 0 1
rl < r 1 0 1 1






U (hr −RU )zs + (1− αlU )[βωlU + 2olRU ](8)
xsD = ω
s
D + max{−βωsD, (hr −RD)zs}(9)
In (8) we have written αlU (hr−RU )zs+(1−αlU )[βωlU +2olRU ] instead of ηlU [(hr−RU )zs]+. The
two terms coincide because ηlU = α
l
U when the long agent is solvent in state U and, when the
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long agent is insolvent, we have that βωlU + 2o
lRU = −ηlU (hr − RU )zlU . From market clearing
we have that zl = −zs, so that:










= βωlU + 2o
lRU
Analogously, we can write the consumption of the long agent as:
xlU = ω
l






D(hr −RD)zl + (1− αsD)βωsD(11)
From this consumption for the short and long agent, we can compute their respective utilities for
a given value of r. The final step to confirm that consumption plans and portfolios correspond
to an equilibrium is to check for optimality. This is done by comparing agents’ utilities with the
levels of utility they would attain by taking the opposite action (e.g. a short agent deciding to
take a long position instead) while considering the choice of the other agent as given. That is,
the short agent must compare his utility with the utility he would get if he chose the portfolio
zsl > 0 instead. The consumption implied by this portfolio would be given by:
xslU = ω
s




sRD + (hr −RD)zsl(13)
Note that in (12), even though the (long) counterparty might be insolvent in state U , this does
not affect consumption of the short agent because now, when he is also taking a long position,
the term (hr − RU )zsl constitutes an obligation for the agent and the repayment rate of his
counterparty is irrelevant.
The long agent must also compare his utility with what he would get if he chose the short
position zls < 0 instead. In this case his consumption would be given by:
xlsU = ω
l
U + (hr −RU )zls(14)
xlsD = ω
l
D + max{−βωlD, (hr −RD)zls}(15)
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We have that the original consumption plans are optimal (and we have an equilibrium) if it is
true that Us(xsU , x
s
D) ≥ Us(xslU , xslD) and U l(xlU , xlD) ≥ U l(xlsU , xlsD).
We can for example, study an economy with initial parameters:
β = 0.35 RU = 1.4 ω
i
U = 4 ω
j
U = 6 a
i = 0.9
h = 0.9 RD = 0.1 ω
i
D = 2 ω
j
D = 4 a
j = 0.2













0.7755 0 0 8.9 1.3 3.9 4.9 8.14 4.7
0.8044 0 0 8.9 1.3 3.9 4.9 8.14 4.7
0.8333 0 0 8.9 1.3 3.9 4.9 8.14 4.7
0.8622 0 0 8.9 1.3 3.9 4.9 8.14 4.7
0.8911 0 0 8.9 1.3 3.9 4.9 8.14 4.7
0.9200 0 0 8.9 1.3 3.9 4.9 8.14 4.7
0.9488 0 0 8.9 1.3 3.9 4.9 8.14 4.7
0.9777 0 0 8.9 1.3 3.9 4.9 8.14 4.7
1.0066 0 0 8.9 1.3 3.9 4.9 8.14 4.7
1.0355 0 1 8.68 1.3 4.12 4.9 7.942 4.744
1.0644 0 1 8.42 1.3 4.38 4.9 7.708 4.796
1.0933 0 1 8.16 1.3 4.64 4.9 7.474 4.848
1.1222 0 1 7.9 1.3 4.9 4.9 7.24 4.9
1.1511 0 1 7.64 1.3 5.16 4.9 7.006 4.952
1.1800 0 1 7.38 1.3 5.42 4.9 6.772 5.004
1.2088 0 1 7.12 1.3 5.68 4.9 6.538 5.056
1.2377 0 1 6.86 1.3 5.94 4.9 6.304 5.108
1.2666 0 1 6.6 1.3 6.2 4.9 6.07 5.16
1.2955 0 1 6.34 1.3 6.46 4.9 5.836 5.212
1.3244 0 1 6.08 1.3 6.72 4.9 5.602 5.264
Notably, there are no equilibria corresponding to cases 3 or 4 in this economy. We can compute



































· 0.35 · 6 + 2 · 1.4
1
= 1.0111
Figure 3 shows agents i and j’s problems when the (gross) repo rate is 1.18 and clearly show
that it is optimal for i to be short in repo (as much as the box constraint allows him) and
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for agent j it is optimal to take the highest long position that he can. The Figure shows
consumption in states U and D for each agent. Sometimes, as with xiD, a kink occurs in the
agents consumption at the point where zi is such that the agents obligations equal his garnishable
income and the agent is indifferent between being solvent or declaring bankruptcy. In other cases,
as for xiU , no kink is observed. This is because the repo position that equalizes obligations and
garnishable income occurs outside the interval that constraints repo positions. In this case, zi
at which the kink would occur is zi = 14.14, which is the portfolio that satisfies the condition
−βωiU = (oi + (1 − h)zi)RU + (hr − RU )zi. Similarly, for x
j
U the kink where j is marginally
solvent occurs for zj = 15.9, also beyond the upper bound on zj . In the case of xjD, two kinks are
observed. The one to the left corresponds to the repo position that makes the agent indifferent
between being solvent or not. The one at zj = 0 occurs because when zj < 0, the agent is a
debtor in state D (meaning that (hr−RD)zj < 0) and so he is not affected by i’s repayment rate
ηiD < 1. When z
j > 0, he is a net creditor, is affected by i’s repayment rate (meaning that his
income is ηiD(hr −RD)zj instead of (hr −RD)zj) and this reduces the slope of x
j
D as a funtion
of zj .
(a) Agent i’s problem. (b) Agent j’s problem.
Figure 3: How consumption and utility at the second date relate to repo positions, when r = 1.18.
As is clear from the previous discussion, for a given set of parameters, there are multiple
equilibria. Regardless of this indeterminacy, we have two conditions that must be satisfied in





, ηjU = −
[βωjU + 2RU ](1− h)
(rh−RU )
(16)




(rh−RD)2 . For the equilibria we have presented here we
have ∂h
∂ηiD
< 0, and ∂h
∂ηjU
< 0.
Figure 4 shows how h is related to the equilibrium values of ηiD and η
j
U , for h ranging from
0.85 to 0.99.
Figure 4: How ηiD and η
j
U relate to h when r = 1.18.
Observe that haicuts move together with the counterparty’s repayment rate (this must always
happen in this 2-agent and 1-security economy. As we will see in section 4, in a competitive
setting, where many agents trade many securities, the impact of the haircut in one security on
the insolvency of an agent becomes less noticeable. It is the other direction that becomes more
relevant: haircuts rise in response to lower repayment rates of the counterparty, for securities
that involve a risk from the creditor’s point of view (have a collateral liquidation value below
the promised repo loan settlement). That is, in a competitive setting, creditors tend to focus




Haircuts in pairwise repo trades are endogenously determined in the equilibrium that we defined.
Existence was established and characterized for the 2-agent and 1-security case for a set of given
parameters. We discuss now what may govern haircuts, that is, how should we expect haircuts
to be set in equilibrium, depending on what are the parameters and other equilibrium variables
for the relevant pair of repo traders.
Suppose agent i has a possession value for security f at the initial node, that is, a binding
box constraint for security f at the initial node - more precisely, the shadow value µif0 of this
constraint is positive. Denoting by λie agent i’s multiplier for the budget constraint at each
node e and νijf the multiplier for the lower bound on repo positions value, from the first order
conditions for agent i’s problem, we get the following expression for hijf
hijf =

































, if µif0 > 0




s + (1− γijs ), γijs = 1 if Iijs > 0, γijs = 0 if Iijs < 0, αis = 1 if agent i is solvent in
state s, αis = 0 if i goes bankrupt in state s, and η
i
s satisfies (5).
It is worth recalling that ηjs is the effective percentage of his debt that agent j pays to all of
his counterparties, so it can be used as a measure of counterparty risk: the lower ηjs is, the riskier
(or less solvent) agent j is in state s, and this must be taking into account by agents deciding
having j and counterparty and, in particular, in setting the terms of repo contracts (hijf ).
Equation (17) is true in any equilibrium and can be used to study the incentives that coun-
terparties i and j have to either increase or decrease the haircut (1 − hijf ) associated to their
repo transactions in response to an increase in the risk of one of the counterparties. Let’s look
at the derivative of hijf with respect to η
j
D, under the assumption that agents’ marginal rates of
income substitution remain unchanged. To be more precise,
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Assumption (Λ): agent i’s marginal rates of substitution of income across the first two dates,
λis/λ
i
0, are not affected by a change in the counterparty j’s effective repayment rate η
j
D.
Although we might not want to take this assumption literally, it is useful to get a sense of
how haircuts move with counterparty risk in a context where agent i is trading in many securities
and has many counterparties, so that a small variation in the default rate of one of them in some
state won’t affect the optimal inter-nodes deflators of agent i.
This assumption holds for linear utilities (recall that the bankruptcy structure ensures the
positivity of consumption in each state, which implies that DU is(x
i) = λisps) in the case of repo
to maturity (dispensing with the third date and allowing for ps = 1) and provided that agent i
is consuming at the initial date (so that DU i0(x
i) = λi0p0) and that the equilibrium commodity
price p0 is not affected by a small change in the effective repayment rate η
j



































When most of the response to a variation in counterparty risk is channeled into a change in
haircuts, rather than a change in the repo rate, we can be more specific about the direction of
change. We say that repo rates are competitive if actions by a pair of agents i and j, in particular
actions that change their solvency rates (ηis and η
j
s) do not affect equilibrium repo rates. This is
a reasonable assumption if there are many agents (and therefore, many pairs of counterparties)
in the economy, but not to be expected in an economy with only two (or very few) agents, as in
the example of section 3. We have,
Proposition 1. Suppose repo rates are competitive. Let us evaluate the impact of ηjD on h
ij
f ,
under a scenario where agents’ marginal rates of substitution are not affected. Say IijD > 0 (i is
a net creditor in the repo market with respect to j) and i is solvent in state D (αiD = η
i
2 = 1). If
agent j’s expected repayment rate ηjD decreases, agent i will want to:
• Increase the haircut (1−hijf ) he charges (pays) in his repo long (short) positions with agent
j, of securities f such that hijf qf0rf > qfD + pDRfD.
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• Decrease haircuts paid to (charged to) agent j for his short (long) repo positions in securities
g such that hijg qg0rg < qgD + pDRgD.
If IijD < 0 (i is a net debtor in the repo market with respect to j), or if i is insolvent in state D,
he has no incentives to increase or decrease the haircut (1− hijf ) in response to expected changes
in ηjD.
Remark 1. The last part of the proposition reflects the fact that if i were a net debtor to agent
j instead, he would not be entitled to any share in the liquidation of agent j’s estate in the event
of agent j’s bankruptcy. Note that as long as agents i and j trade in the repo market, one of
them must be a net creditor and proposition 1 applies to either i or j, as long as the agent is
solvent in state D.
Proof. See the appendix.
Suppose that i is a net creditor with counterparty j, and that zijf > 0, and that h
ij
f qf0rf >
qfD + pDRfD. If agent i anticipates a decrease in j’s expected repayment rate, η
j
D, then i would
like to charge j a higher haircut (by lowering hijf ). To understand why this is so, note that the
magnitude of j’s net debt to i, is given by zijf [qf0rfh
ij
f − (qfD + pDRfD)] and lowering h
ij
f would
reduce this debt and, therefore, the loss resulting from agent j’s bankruptcy.
Now suppose hijf qf0rf < qfD + pDRfD. If everything else is as in the previous paragraph,
a decrease in ηjD will be an incentive for i to collect a lower haircut from j (by raising h
ij
f ).
Even though agent i is a net creditor to agent j when adding up all of his repo transactions
with j, he has now a debt to j associate to his position on security f with absolute value
zijf [(qfD+pDRfD)−qf0rfh
ij
f ]. That is, the collateral kept by i when lending cash to j has now a
higher market value than what j owes to i. If hijf increases, he gets to keep more of the collateral
in the event of j’s bankruptcy.
In both cases, i has incentives to respond in a way that counteracts the loss in income when
j becomes more insolvent in state D. The appropriate response depends on the relationship of
the value of j’s debt (qf0rfh
ij
f ) with the market value of the collateral (qfD + pDRfD). This
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relationship is what is usually understood as asset risk, the risk is precisely that the value of
the collateral might decrease in some future date and become insufficient to cover the value of
the debt that it is backing. In practice, haircuts are set so that it is expected that10 hijf qf0rf <
(qfD+pDRfD). This should be considered the most relevant case in the context the proposition.
Proposition 1 is useful to understand agents’ incentives when a perceived increase in coun-
terparty risk occurs. It should not be interpreted as a comparative statics analysis. One should
expect to observe different haircuts but also different repo positions in equilibria with different
repayment rates. One could expect that even the roles of net creditor and net debtor might get
reversed when repayment rates change.
5 Concluding remarks
Repo markets have attracted a lot of attention in the applied macro and finance literatures,
particularly since the 2008 financial crisis. These literatures have focused on how leverage in
these markets has impacted on the whole economy, how this leverage depends on repo haircuts
and what determines these margins. However, at the theoretical level, these important issues had
not been addressed yet, possibly due to the complexity and intrinsic non-convexities involved in a
bankruptcy model where counterparty risk could be understood and margins could be explained
as endogenous variables.
We contribute in that direction, building a general model, exhibiting concrete examples of
bankruptcy equilibrium for a simple economy, and characterizing how counterparty and asset
risks interact to determine repo haircuts. Full recognition of the recourse nature of repo loans
is crucial. This implies also that default must be modelled in terms of insolvency and according
to bankruptcy rules. The model can be made richer, incorporating more detailed institutional
aspects, or allowing also for centrally cleared repo, but the main drivers of margins seem to
identifiable already in a simple model. Competitiveness versus small numbers of traders or asset
10Or if the value of the collateral decreases and doesn’t cover the value of the debt, a margin call is issued by
the lender of funds.
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risk in a creditor’s perspective (suggesting default tensions) versus a debtor’s risk perspective
(concerned with repo fails instead) are some of the key issues in assessing how counterparty risk
impacts on repo haircuts and the resulting leverage.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From (18), if rf is competitive, the derivative of h
ij



























Moreover, we have that
dhijf
dηjs




the same sign as [(qfs + psRfs) − hijf qf0rf ]. To see that this is the case, look at the first order


































































In an equilibrium as the one which existence we have proven, we have αiU = 1. The theorem
assumes that i is a net creditor so we have γijD = 1. We have that agent j is solvent in state U .
We must have κijU = 1. We have assumed that i is solvent in state D, so that α
i
D = 1, we can
suppose that ηjD ∈ (0, 1) (so that j was risky to begin with and so that it makes sense to take
the derivative with respect to ηjD which belongs in the set [0, 1]). From all these considerations,




















s as long as at least one of the
following conditions holds:
(a) Agent i values the possession of security f (µif0 > 0).
(b) Agent i’s position zijf has a market value at the lower bound.
(c) Counterparty j is somewhat risky in state D (ηjD ∈ (0, 1)).
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